Reimportation of Prescription Drugs: Long-Lasting Relief or a Short-Term Analgesic? by Drabiak, Benjamin A.
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 4 Issue 1 
January 2005 
Reimportation of Prescription Drugs: Long-Lasting Relief or a 
Short-Term Analgesic? 
Benjamin A. Drabiak 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Food and Drug Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Benjamin A. Drabiak, Reimportation of Prescription Drugs: Long-Lasting Relief or a Short-Term 
Analgesic?, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 135 (2005), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
 
REIMPORTATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: 
LONG-LASTING RELIEF OR A SHORT-TERM 
ANALGESIC? 
INTRODUCTION 
As scientific advancement creates a higher standard of living, 
consumer demand for improved practices and products increases 
concurrently; however, the advancements often come with a large price 
tag.1 For example, prescription drugs provide a variety of benefits to the 
public, yet the rising cost of prescription drug coverage is a hot topic of 
debate, often aired over the nightly news2 and ubiquitous in popular 
newspapers3 and magazines.4 This debate also extends to the political 
arena, where the rising cost of prescriptions has been noted in several 
political campaign ads.5 Central to this debate is the tension between 
health and industrial policy, where the need to control prescription drug 
 1. For an insightful discussion of this medical paradox involving medical advances, see Jerry 
Stanton, Comment, Lesson for the United States from Foreign Price Controls on Pharmaceuticals, 16 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 149 (2000). Stanton notes that medical advances only precipitate the further need for 
more significant medical advances. Id. at 149. That is, those people who survive life-threatening 
illnesses, or those who never are exposed to such an illness due to the modern marvels of medicine, 
tend to lead long lives, and as such, at some point, require advanced medical procedures and 
prescription drugs. Id. 
 2. See, e.g., NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Rx Drug Coverage (PBS television broadcast, July 30, 
2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/july-dec02/drugs_7-30.html (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2004). 
 3. See, e.g., Joel Millman, Not Your Generic Smugglers: American Seniors Flock to Border 
Town for Cheap Prescriptions, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2003, at D3; Paul Pringle, Not-So Corner 
Drugstore: Canadian Web Firms are Supplying Low-Cost Prescriptions to Many Elderly Americans 
but Manufacturers and Regulators are Chafing, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2003, at A1; David Schwab, 
Primes: The Issues Behind the Battle Over Drug Prices, SEATTLE TIMES, June 3, 2001, at D1; Robin 
Toner, Major Battle Looms Over Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at A34; Terry Frieden, Judge 
Orders Internet Drug Firm Closed, CNN.com, Nov. 7, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/HEALTH/ 
11/06/canada.drugs/index.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
 4. Nathan Thornburgh, Drug Costs: The Canadian Cure, TIME, Nov. 24, 2003, at 19; David 
Noonan et al., Why Drugs Cost So Much: High Stakes, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 22; Donald L. 
Barlett & James B. Steele, Why We Pay So Much for Drugs, TIME, Feb. 2, 2004, at 44. 
 5. National political campaigns include television ads sponsored by MoveOn.org, attacking the 
Bush Administration’s handling of health care reform. Press Release, MoveOn.org, MoveOn.org Voter 
Fund Takes Bush SOTU Medicare Ad into Five States (Jan. 22, 2004), http://www.moveon.org/ 
press/pr/release12004.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). MoveOn.org Voter Fund spent $1.9 million to 
carry this campaign in key battleground states, including Florida, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, and West 
Virginia. Id. The ad featured voice-over of actual images of President Bush’s State of the Union 
speech, with the voice-over suggesting that seniors will be paying substantially more under the new 
Medicare bill. Id. Local campaign ads include television and Internet ads sponsored by an Illinois 
Democratic Primary candidate for the United States Senate, Blair Hull. See M. Blair Hull, Democrat 
for U.S. Senate, http://www.blairhull.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2004). 
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spending directly competes with the need to provide incentives for an 
industry that provides significant health and economic benefits.6 This 
debate often centers around the substantial difference in the prices charged 
in the United States and those charged for the same drugs in other 
countries, most notably Canada.7 The debate also concerns balancing the 
need for affordable prescription drugs with the need to provide incentives 
for future research and development (R&D).8 
On one side of this debate is the importance of preserving the free 
enterprise system that precipitates the newest and greatest advances in the 
health care industry.9 The pharmaceutical industry estimates that it costs 
between $500 and $800 million to bring a drug to market.10 However, 
while the R&D costs for bringing a single treatment to market can be quite 
high, the price actually paid for a single drug may be substantially less.11 
Additionally, investment in the pharmaceutical industry is consistently 
profitable,12 and with continued increases in drug spending each year, it 
shows no signs of slowing down.13 
On the other side of this debate is the importance of affordable 
prescription drugs for the American consumer. A substantial number of 
Americans have one or more chronic health conditions and require access 
 6. David Gross, Prescription Drug Prices in Canada, 62 AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE 
BRIEF 1, 18 (2003), http://research.aarp.org/health/ib62_can_rx.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. International Prescription Drug Parity: Are Americans Being Protected or Gouged?: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and Wellness of the Comm. on Government Reform, 
108th Cong. 1-5 (2003) [hereinafter Hearing: International Prescription Drug Parity] (statement of 
Rep. Dan Burton, Chairman, Subcomm. on Human Rights and Wellness). 
 10. Id. at 2. 
 11. Id. at 2. “Only ten to thirty percent of the products in development actually make it to the 
marketplace, so companies add the cost of failed products into the R&D costs of drugs that ultimately 
are approved.” Id. 
 12. See Robert H. Ballance, Market and Industrial Structure, in CONTESTED GROUND: PUBLIC 
PURPOSE AND PRIVATE INTEREST IN THE REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 95 (Peter Davis ed., 
1996). Over the last three decades, the pharmaceutical industry experienced a return on equity over six 
percent greater than the average of other industries. Id. at 103–04. In the 2002 annual Fortune 500 
survey, the pharmaceutical industry topped the list of the most profitable industries, with a return of 
seventeen percent on revenue. Barlett & Steele, supra note 4, at 46–47. 
 13. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), National Health Care Expenditures 
Projections Tables, Table 2: National Health Expenditure amounts, and Average Annual Percent 
Change by type of Expenditure: Selected Calendar Years 1980–2012, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
statistics/nhe/projections-2002/t2.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). Between 1990 and 2001, prescription 
drug spending in the United States grew by about twelve percent per year. Id. For another similar 
estimate of the increase in spending on prescription drugs, see Martha Ann Holt, International 
Prescription Drug Cost Containment Strategies and Suggestions for Reform in the United States, 26 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 325 (2003) (noting an increase in drug spending in the United States of 
between sixteen and twenty percent per year). 
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to affordable prescription drugs in order to lead happy, healthy lives.14 The 
rising cost of prescription drug coverage has many American consumers—
older American consumers in particular—looking for more affordable 
alternatives.15 Many Americans are uninsured or underinsured for the high 
cost of prescription drugs,16 and often fail to purchase necessary 
medication,17 even when they have serious medical conditions, such as 
heart disease.18 
A third, and often ignored, aspect of this debate concerns the 
government’s interest in regulating prescription drugs in order to ensure 
product safety and quality.19 Specifically, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) is charged with ensuring that the protections 
afforded to consumers who purchase prescription drugs from their local 
pharmacy are extended to consumers who obtain prescriptions by 
alternative means.20 As online pharmaceutical sales continue to increase, it 
becomes more challenging for the government to regulate the products 
dispensed, and, as such, the government cannot provide consumers with 
 14. Hearing: International Prescription Drug Parity, supra note 9, at 2. “As many as 108 million 
Americans have one or more chronic health conditions such as diabetes, high blood pressure, asthma, 
and heart disease, and many require prescription drugs to manage these conditions.” Id. Seventy-five 
percent of Americans age fifty to sixty-four take at least one prescription drug, and fourteen percent of 
women aged sixty-five take five prescription drugs every week. Id. 
 15. See Patricia Barry, More Americans Go North For Drugs, AARP BULLETIN, Apr. 2003, at 3; 
see also Gross, supra note 6, at 1. 
 16. Importation of Prescription Drugs from Canada, MEDICARE RIGHTS CENTER POLICY BRIEF, 
Oct. 10, 2003, available at http://www.medicarerights.org/fairmedicare_reimportation.html (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2004). Seniors and the disabled often lack coverage and typically use more prescription 
drugs than younger, healthier Americans. Id. In 1999, thirty-eight percent of all people with Medicare 
had no coverage for prescription drugs, and even more had inadequate drug coverage. Id. 
 17. Karen Donelan et al., The Cost of Health Care System Change: Public Discontent in Five 
Nations, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS, May–June 1999, at 206. Forty-two percent of uninsured Americans 
reported that they did not fill their prescriptions due to financial concerns. Id. 
 18. Alex D. Federman et al., Supplemental Insurance and Use of Effective Cardiovascular Drugs 
Among Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries With Coronary Heart Disease, 286 JAMA 1732 (2001). 
 19. In 2000, Congress passed, and “the President signed into law the MEDS Act to allow U.S. 
consumers, pharmacists, and wholesalers to purchase FDA-approved prescription drugs on the 
international market,” but the FDA has not implemented the law, claiming that it cannot assure the 
safety of the products being shipped into the United States. Hearing: International Prescription Drug 
Parity, supra note 9, at 2. The FDA is charged with regulating products for the safety and protection of 
the American consumer under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040, codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. 
(1938) [hereinafter FDCA]. The FDA has the legal authority to take action against the importation, 
sale, or distribution of an adulterated or misbranded drug; the importation, sale, or distribution of an 
unapproved new drug; the illegal promotion of a drug; the sale or dispensing of a prescription drug 
without a valid prescription; and counterfeit drugs. Hearing: International Prescription Drug Parity, 
supra note 9, at 40 (statement of William Hubbard, FDA Associate Commissioner for Policy, Planning 
and Legislation). 
 20. Id. at 38–39. 
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adequate assurance that prescription drugs purchased over the Internet are 
safe.21 
For many Americans, the savings obtained from ordering prescription 
drugs from Canada can be quite substantial.22 Although U.S. law bars the 
importation of prescription drugs from Canada,23 the FDA has often 
overlooked such actions and instead invoked a discretionary “personal 
use” exemption.24 Consumers take advantage of this popular and often-
publicized alternative in a variety of ways.25 For example, American 
consumers may physically travel to Canada26 to buy prescription drugs.27 
Alternatively, Americans not close enough to the border sometimes 
 21. Id. at 39. Although online pharmaceutical sales are important for many consumers, the FDA 
is concerned that some consumers may have difficulty identifying which Internet sites that sell 
legitimate products, thus placing their health and safety in jeopardy. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Jennifer Rak, An RX for Reform: A Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 12 
HEALTH MATRIX 449 (2002). Seniors can save as much as ninety percent on needed medications, with 
a busload of fifty seniors saving as much as $48,000 per year. Id. at 449. 
 23. FDCA, supra note 19, and accompanying text. The importation of prescription drugs from 
Canada into the United States contravenes various provisions of the FDCA. E-drugs: Who Regulates 
Internet Pharmacies?: Hearing before the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 106th 
Cong. 13-15 (2000) [hereinafter Hearing: E-drugs] (statement of Jane E. Henney, M.D., 
Commissioner of Food and Drugs, FDA). 
 24. Julius Melnitzer, Glaxo Disrupts Canadian Drug Pipeline into United States: Canadian 
Trade Commission Supports Glaxo’s Ban, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, June 2003, at 34. This exemption is 
often narrowly construed to allow for prescription drugs shipped by Canadian pharmacists directly to 
American citizens. Id. Although the discretionary exemption has no statutory basis, a citizen has never 
been prosecuted for violating the law. Id. The “personal use” exemption usually consists of a ninety-
day supply intended for personal use. Id. 
 25. The focus of this Note will be primarily confined to the reimportation of prescription drugs 
from Canada by personal reimportation: traveling to Canada, filling a prescription, and returning to the 
United States; or filling a prescription online and having the filled prescription shipped to the United 
States. 
 26. Similarly, many American consumers travel to Mexico to obtain prescription drug products 
due to their easy accessibility (most products do not require a prescription in Mexico), their lower cost, 
and because products are available in Mexico that are not available in the United States. Examining 
Prescription Drug Importation: A Review of a Proposal to Allow Third Parties to Reimport 
Prescription Drugs: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
107th Cong. 59 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing: Examining Prescription Drug Importation] (statement of 
Marv Shepherd, Director, Center for Pharmacoeconomic Studies, College of Pharmacy, University of 
Texas). The pharmaceutical business in Mexican border towns is indeed a huge tourist attraction that 
injects hundreds of millions of dollars into the Mexican economy. Id. at 62. This is evidenced by the 
fact that there are 1400 Farmacias in Tijuana, while in nearby San Diego there are just over 100 
pharmacies. Id. 
 These lower prices exist because “Mexico is at a less advanced stage of economic development, 
has lower real wages and per capita incomes, and has lower prices for many goods and services.” 
PATRICIA M. DANZON, PRICE COMPARISONS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS: A REVIEW OF U.S. AND 
CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES 32 (1999). Thus, it is no surprise that prices in Mexico are lower, given 
lower per capita gross domestic product, governmental use of monopsony power, weaker patent 
protection, and numerous price-sensitive consumers. Id. at 34. 
 27. See generally Barry, supra note 15 (describing elderly consumers traveling to Canada to fill 
prescriptions). 
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purchase prescription drugs by mail order, often via the Internet.28 This 
trend of seeking out lower-cost prescription drugs will continue as 
Americans, especially older Americans, search for ways to pay for their 
ever-increasing prescription drug expenses.29 
The main reason that prescription drug prices are lower in other 
industrialized nations is that government-imposed price controls keep the 
cost down.30 In comparison, the United States has struggled to preserve 
price parity, largely because pharmaceutical industry pricing is 
fundamentally unregulated.31 As the American public grows older, a 
longer, healthier life requires both affordable and innovative prescription 
drugs. To ensure that the American consumer has access to both, Congress 
needs to reevaluate the health care system. However, before deciding what 
legislation to pass in order to reform the health care system, Congress 
must balance the need to curb prescription drug spending with the need to 
maintain an economically healthy pharmaceutical industry. 
Part I of this Note discusses the legislative history of the regulation of 
prescription drugs, as well as that of recent Congressional legislation 
aimed at establishing prescription drug price parity. Part II examines the 
historical disparity of the pharmaceutical industry’s pricing structure on 
the national and international level, analyzing both methodology of price 
comparison and potential reasons for price disparity. Part III makes 
recommendations, based on the structure of the pharmaceutical industry 
and prescription drug coverage models from foreign countries, in 
particular Canada, for what the United States could, and should, do in 
response to the increasing cost of prescription drugs. Part IV proposes a 
balanced solution that incorporates regulatory methods taken from several 
countries. Finally, this Note concludes that without some balanced 
government intervention, either the American consumer will be forced to 
pay impossible amounts for prescriptions—requiring a choice between 
necessary medication and other living expenses—or the pharmaceutical 
industry will be unable to continue providing substantial health and 
 28. Id. See also Frieden, supra note 3. 
 29. Melnitzer, supra note 24, at 34. Overall, 1.2 million American consumers are spending $2 
billion every year to purchase prescription drugs from Canada, at thirty to ninety percent below 
American drugstore prices. Id. In Fall 2002, several insurers, including AARP, agreed to reimburse 
policyholders who filled their prescriptions in Canada. Id. 
 30. Michele L. Creech, Make a Run for the Border: Why the United States Government is 
Looking to the International Market for Affordable Prescription Drugs, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 593, 
594 (2001). Other countries implement governmental regulations to negotiate the launch price of drugs 
with pharmaceutical manufacturers, limit price increases to inflation rates, or forbid price increases 
altogether. Id. 
 31. See Stanton, supra note 1, at 155. 
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economic benefits to not only the American public, but also to the global 
community at large. 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A. History and Development of Current U.S. Regulation of 
Pharmaceuticals 
The long history of the regulation of pharmaceuticals32 began in the 
United States in 1902 with the Virus, Serum, and Antitoxin Act.33 Shortly 
thereafter was the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act,34 which took 
action against fraudulent remedies and unlabeled products.35 The Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)36 was the first attempt to require 
drugs to be tested for safety and labeled for use.37 These acts were passed 
in order to ensure that the products were healthy and safe for consumers.38 
The Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987 (PDMA)39 and the 
Prescription Drug Amendments of 199240 amended the FDCA to prohibit 
prescription drug reimportation.41 This legislation was proposed based on 
Congressional hearings regarding serious potential problems relating to 
the efficacy and accountability within the system of the reimportation of 
prescription pharmaceuticals to be sold to American consumers.42 After 
five days of hearings, a formal report issued by the subcommittee noted 
 32. For analysis of the history of biologics regulation, see, for example, Edward L. Korwek, 
Human Biological Drug Regulation: Past, Present, and Beyond the Year 2000, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
123 (2000); PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW, CASES & 
MATERIALS 1–22 (2d ed. 1991). 
 33. Virus, Serum, and Antitoxin Act, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1902). 
 34. Pure Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–15 (1934) (repealed in 1938 by 21 U.S.C. § 392(a) (1988)). 
 35. JAMES NIELSEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL DRUG LAW 4 (1992). 
 36. FDCA, supra note 19. Cf. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (original version). 
 37. NIELSEN, supra note 35, at 5–6. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95 (1987) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 331(t), 333(v), 
353(c)–(e), 381). Congress’ intent in passing this legislation was to avoid “an unacceptable risk that 
counterfeit, adulterated, misbranded, subpotent or expired drugs will be sold to American consumers.” 
102 Stat. at 95–96.  
 40. Pub. L. No. 102-353, 106 Stat. 941 (1992) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 333, 353, 353 
note, 381). 
 41. Guidelines for State Licensing of Wholesale Prescription Drug Distributors, 21 C.F.R. pt. 
205 (2004). See also supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 42. Drug Diversion: Prescription Drug Diversion and the American Consumer: What You Think 
You See May Not Be What You Get: a Staff Report by the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations 
of the Comm. of Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 1 (1985), Introduction. “American consumers can 
no longer purchase prescription drugs with the certainty that the products are safe and effective.” Id. 
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the following concerns: (1) the existence and method of operation of a 
wholesale submarket that prevents effective control over the true sources 
of drugs; (2) the reimportation of drugs that may have become subpotent 
or adulterated during foreign handling and shipping; (3) the existing 
system of providing samples to physicians through manufacturers’ sales 
representatives may encourage adulteration and/or misbranding; (4) the 
release of drugs by health care institutions helps fuel the diversion market; 
and (5) the counterfeiting of brand names by persons in foreign countries 
promotes the marketing of subpotent or impotent drugs, competes with 
American markets, and tarnishes the good name of legitimate products in 
those countries.43  
In 2000, the United States Congress passed, and then-President Clinton 
signed, the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety (MEDS) Act44 to allow 
pharmacists and wholesalers to import covered products into the United 
States.45 However, prior to implementation, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services must demonstrate that implementation would pose no 
additional risk to the public’s health and safety, and would result in a 
significant reduction in the cost of covered products to the American 
consumer.46 
In December 2000, then-Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
Donna Shalala, refused to implement the MEDS Act, contending that 
reimportation of prescription drugs created serious health risks, and 
expressing doubt that reimportation would result in a substantial price 
reduction.47 As such, the MEDS Act was deimplemented.48 
 43. Dangerous Medicine: The Risk to American Consumers from Prescription Drug Diversion 
and Counterfeiting, Report by the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 99th Cong. 2-4 (1986) (Chairman Dingell’s letter of transmittal and Staff Report 
Findings). 
 44. The Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000, 21 U.S.C. § 384 (2000) (deimplemented 
by the Secretary of Health & Human Services (HHS) Dec. 27, 2000) [hereinafter MEDS Act]. 
 45. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-948, at 39, 42 (2000). The definition of covered products includes 
prescription drugs other than controlled substances or biological products. Id. 
 46. Id. at 43. The statute also contained a sunset provision that would have canceled the legal 
effect of the regulations five years after going into effect. Id. 
 47. Marc Kaufman, Shalala Rejects GOP Drug Price Law: Plan Won’t Save Money, She Says, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000, at A1; Robert Pear, In a Turnaround, White House Kills Drug-Import 
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2000, at A1. 
 48. Id. 
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B. Recent Legislation 
Although the MEDS Act has not yet been reimplemented,49 Congress 
has considered several bills that would permit reimportation of 
prescription drugs. In 2002, the Senate passed legislation that would 
permit importation of a ninety-day supply of prescription drugs for 
personal use from Canada.50 This legislation, however, was not passed by 
the House of Representatives and did not become law.51 
Congress has continued to consider bills that push for prescription drug 
pricing reform, with many legislators’ campaigns heavily focused on 
prescription drug issues.52 Recently, the International Prescription Drug 
Parity Act53 was introduced in response to the alarmingly high cost of 
pharmaceuticals in the United States, as compared to Mexico and Canada 
and other nations.54 The Prescription Drug Fairness for Seniors Act55 was 
recently introduced in response to studies that show drug manufacturers 
engage in price discrimination, charging seniors and others who buy their 
own prescription drugs more than twice as much as they charge their most 
favored customers, such as the federal government and large health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs).56 The Health Care Research and 
Development and Taxpayer Protection Act57 was introduced to prevent 
taxpayers from being charged twice for the same drug.58 The 
 49. Tommy Thompson, the current Secretary of Health and Human Services, has described the 
legislation as “doubtful.” Sara Fritz, Election Over, Prescription Law Languishes, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at A1. As such, it is unlikely that the MEDS Act will be reconsidered and 
implemented any time soon. Id. 
 50. Gross, supra note 6, at 1. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Congressman Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Bills & Legislation: Legislation: Three Bills 
Push for Prescription Drug Pricing Reform, at http://bernie.house.gov/prescriptions/bills.asp (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2004); M. Blair Hull, Democrat for U.S. Senate, at http://www.blairhull.com (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2004). 
 53. International Prescription Drug Parity Act, H.R. 1885, 106th Cong. (1999), available at 
http://bernie.house.gov/prescriptions/bills.asp (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).  
 54. Id. H.R. 1885 would allow American distributors and pharmacists to reimport prescription 
drugs into the United States from Mexico and Canada as long as the drugs meet strict safety standards 
and are approved by the FDA. Id.  
 55. The Prescription Drug Fairness for Seniors Act, H.R. 664, 106th Cong. (1999), available at 
http://bernie.house.gov/prescriptions/bills.asp (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).  
 56. Id. The bill would protect seniors from drug price discrimination and make prescription drugs 
available to Medicare beneficiaries at substantially reduced prices. Id. This bill would allow 
pharmacies that serve Medicare beneficiaries to purchase prescription drugs at the low prices available 
to the federal government and other favored customers. Id.  
 57. The Health Care Research and Development and Taxpayer Protection Act, H.R. 626, 106th 
Cong. (1999), available at http://bernie.house.gov/prescriptions/bills.asp (last visited Sept. 6, 2004). 
 58. Id. The bill was introduced to prevent taxpayers from being charged twice; currently, 
taxpayers fund the development of drugs at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The NIH then sells 
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Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 200359 was introduced to allow the 
importation of drugs from twenty-five industrialized countries, including 
Canada.60 However, none of these introduced bills have become law. 
II. DISPARITY OF PRICING: UNITED STATES AND CANADA  
Although the general consensus is that prescription drugs cost less in 
Canada than they do in the United States, the magnitude of the price 
difference is largely open to debate.61 This debate essentially stems from 
methodological differences in cross-national price comparisons for 
pharmaceuticals.62  
A. Methodology 
A more complete understanding of methodological issues helps to 
clarify underlying themes in this debate regarding the magnitude of price 
differentials. First, methodological differences exist in calculating 
prescription drug prices at different points in the distribution chain.63 For 
example, some studies examine prices charged by drug manufacturers, 
while other studies examine retail prices.64 Second, within studies of only 
retail prices, differences exist regarding which consumer price is used.65 
For example, in the United States, cash-paying consumers often pay the 
highest prices, while insurers and HMOs are able to bargain for discounts 
and manufacturer rebates, and government programs are often able to 
negotiate the best prices.66 Comparatively, Canadian consumers 
the drug to a pharmaceutical company, from whom the drugs are ultimately purchased by consumers. 
Id. 
 59. The Pharmaceutical Market Access Act, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 60. John Kasprak, Prescription Drug Importation, OLR RESEARCH REPORT, Oct. 7, 2003, 
available at http://www.cga.state.ct.us/2003/olrdata/ph/rpt/2003-R-0713.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 
2004). This bill passed the House of Representatives on July 25, 2003, and is currently in the Senate. 
Id. Its intent is to direct the Department of Health and Human Services to adopt regulations concerning 
the importation of prescription drugs. Id. 
 61. Gross, supra note 6, at 6. 
 62. Patricia M. Danzon and Jeong D. Kim, International Price Comparisons for 
Pharmaceuticals: Measurement and Policy Issues, 14 (Supp. 1) PHARMACOECONOMICS 115 (1998). 
Danzon and Kim suggest that price comparisons are commonly used for one of two purposes. First, 
price comparisons based on a sample of products can be used to draw conclusions about differences in 
average price levels to evaluate drug prices. Id. at 116. Second, price comparisons can be examined 
cross-nationally to determine domestic prices for new products. Id. See also Gross, supra note 6, at 5. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. See generally DANZON, supra note 26, at 13–26 (comparing the retail price with the 
Federal Supply Schedule best price). 
 65. Gross, supra note 6, at 5. 
 66. Id. See generally WILLIAM VON OEHSEN, PHARMACEUTICAL DISCOUNTS UNDER FEDERAL 
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experience little variation.67 Third, the samples of prescription drugs 
compared vary widely.68 And fourth, drug price comparisons on the 
international level lead to logistical problems, including choosing an 
exchange rate69 and weighing each drug’s price difference given its market 
share.70 
Because of the above methodological issues, measuring average price 
levels is difficult and often requires comparisons based on comprehensive, 
representative selections of products from the manufacturer.71 However, 
obtaining broad, comprehensive samples of products can be problematic 
because there is great variation across countries regarding product 
availability.72 This creates an inherent trade-off between the desire to 
compare only identical products and the reality of comparing a 
representative sample, which often includes generic and therapeutic 
substitutes.73 
LAW: STATE PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIES, PUBLIC HEALTH INSTITUTE: PHARMACEUTICALS AND 
INDIGENT CARE PROGRAM (2001), available at http://www.ppsv.com/issues/pharm_discounts.htm 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2004). 
 67. Steven Morgan et al., Whither Seniors’ Pharmacare: Lessons From (And For) Canada, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS, May–June 2003, at 49–59. 
 68. Gross, supra note 6, at 5, 10. Some studies are designed to focus only on price differences of 
patented drugs, some studies consider price differences of all commonly used drugs, both patented and 
generic, and some studies focus only on drugs with high volume sales. Id. 
 69. Id. at 5. An ideal exchange rate is one that is not sensitive to day-to-day currency fluctuations 
but is still able to capture the costs and savings of a citizen of one country purchasing prescription 
drugs in the other country. Id. In particular, the extent to which the savings fluctuate when an 
American consumer purchases prescription drugs in Canada is dependent upon the exchange rate 
utilized. Id. 
 70. Gross, supra note 6, at 5, 11. In choosing a price index, or calculating an aggregate or 
average price differential, products can be weighted on the basis of their relative importance in the 
market based on volume of sales, or given an unweighted average, where each product is given equal 
weight in the calculation. Id.  
 71. Danzon & Kim, supra note 62, at 116. Comparisons of individual product prices should 
consider the manufacturer’s entire product portfolio rather than focus on a single product, as 
production and R&D costs cannot be allocated to a particular product. Id. at 115–16. Moreover, 
appropriate weights of the sample products must be calculated in order to arrive at accurate 
calculations regarding the relative importance of different medicines as relative importance of various 
medicines varies across countries. DANZON, supra note 26, at 11. 
 72. Danzon & Kim, supra note 62, at 116. Variation across countries can be found in drug 
availability, dosage forms, strengths, and pack sizes. Id. 
 73. Id. A study that requires sample products to match on all dimensions, including compound, 
manufacturer, and strength, results in a very small and unrepresentative sample of the overall body of 
drugs available. Id. The alternative, which would allow generics and over-the-counter substitutes and 
allow different dosage forms, strengths, and pack sizes, would create a more valid comparison. Id. 
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B. Price Differentials 
The practice of price discounting, or charging different prices to 
different consumers for the same goods and services, is a fairly common 
business practice.74 Price discounting may be done on the basis of volume 
discounts or quality discounts, and is often driven by differences in the 
price sensitivity of the consumer.75 However, in order to discount 
effectively the price of pharmaceuticals, three conditions are necessary:76 
first, resale potential must be limited;77 second, sellers must maintain some 
degree of control of market prices;78 and third, there must be demand, 
consisting of consumers with different price sensitivities.79 
There are several possible explanations for prescription drug price 
differences between the United States and Canada, but four reasons in 
particular seem to play a key role in price disparity.80 These include 
governmental oversight by means of a review board, third-party 
purchasers, litigation fees, and R&D costs.81 
 74. DANZON, supra note 26, at 38–39. Price discounting is present in hospital, physician, and 
pharmacy services, and can also be seen in the senior citizen discounts offered by movie theaters, 
buses, and restaurants. Id.  
 75. Id. at 38. Volume discounts tend to reflect economies of scale, whereas quality discounts tend 
to reflect differences in service or convenience of a good or service. Id. By offering a lower price to 
consumers who are more price-sensitive, the producer is able to increase sales to these customers 
while continuing to collect typical revenues from less price-sensitive consumers. Id. at 39. As such, 
price discounting is one method of gaining incremental sales and increasing the market share of the 
particular drug. Id. 
 76. ERNST R. BERNDT, UNIFORM PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 7–11 
(1994). 
 77. Id. at 8. If resale by a low-price buyer to a high-price buyer was effortless, profits would go 
to the low-price buyer rather than the producer. Id. As such, the potential for this type of resale tends 
to prevent effective price discounting. Id. 
 78. Id. In a perfectly competitive market, the producer is only able to charge the market price. Id. 
This price, however, may not be sufficient to cover sunk costs of discovery, research, and 
development. Id. Branded products and patent protection help the seller to maintain some control over 
price. Id. at 8–9. 
 79. Id. The seller’s ability to identify potential consumers based on price responsiveness is 
necessary for effective price discounting. Id. For example, airline fares for last-minute flights are 
higher than fares for flights reserved weeks or months in advance because the desperate traveler has 
little opportunity for substitutes and, as such, is less price sensitive. Id. at 10. 
 80. For analysis of several secondary factors, see Creech, supra note 30. These secondary factors 
include an increase in the prescribing of drugs, patent protection, lobbying, and campaign 
contributions. Id. at 603–09. 
 81. See infra notes 82–114 and accompanying text. 
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1. Government Regulation of Price in Other Countries 
First, Canada’s federal Patented Medicine Prices Review Board 
(PMPRB) regulates the maximum prices that can be charged for patented 
drugs.82 Comparatively, no such regulations exist in the United States.83 In 
Canada, all patented prescription drugs sold are subject to the PMPRB 
pricing guidelines, which regulate the price a manufacturer can charge for 
any patented drug sold in Canada.84 The PMPRB determines maximum 
introductory prices for new patented drugs, as well as increases in the 
prices of existing drugs.85 Instead of determining a drug’s price before 
being marketed in Canada, the PMPRB reviews information on launch 
prices and sales of the same drugs in other countries.86 Price disparity 
between the countries, then, can be partially attributed to Canada’s 
regulatory PMPRB and the lack of a similar regulatory agency in the 
United States. 
 82. Patented Medicine Review Board, Annual Report for the Year Ending December 31, 1999 
(2000), available at http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/CMFiles/ar-96-e12tpo-472003-7097.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2004). The PMPRB establishes and enforces guidelines that determine the maximum 
prices at which manufacturers can sell brand name drugs. Id. at 9. Under the guidelines, introductory 
prices of new drugs can not exceed the median of the prices of the same drugs in other industrialized 
counties. Id. at 27. Prices of patented drugs that do not provide a significant breakthrough in treating 
diseases must not exceed the maximum price of other drugs that treat the same disease, and once this 
introductory price is established, subsequent price increases are limited to changes in the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). Id.  
 83. Gross, supra note 6, at 11. 
 84. Id. The PMPRB is a quasi-judicial body that regulates prices that a manufacturer of 
prescription drugs can charge. Id. at 11–12. The PMPRB has extensive jurisdiction, including authority 
over patented drugs sold by manufacturers to Canadian hospitals, wholesalers, retail pharmacies, and 
other bodies. Id. at 12. 
 85. Id. The PMPRB was established in 1987 to complement a change in Canadian law that 
strengthened patent protection on pharmaceutical products by providing greater market exclusivity. Id. 
Prior to the establishment of the PMPRB, patented pharmaceutical products sold in Canada had little 
right of market exclusivity free from generic drugs. Id. 
 86. Id. at 12–13. The prices of the drugs must conform to the following guidelines: (1) 
“[m]anufacturer prices for most new patented drugs are limited so that the cost of therapy using the 
new drug does not exceed the highest cost of therapy with existing drugs used to treat the same 
disease”; (2) “[m]anufacturer prices of breakthrough patented drugs and those that bring a substantial 
improvement are limited to the median of the prices charged for the same drug in other industrialized 
countries listed in the PMPRB’s Regulations,” which include France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States; (3) “[m]anufacturer price increases for 
patented medicines after launch are limited to changes in the general CPI”; and (4) “[m]anufacturer 
prices of a patented drug in Canada may at no time exceed the highest price for the same drug in the 
countries listed in the Regulations.” Id. 
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2. Third-Party Purchasers 
Second, third-party purchasers in Canada have created competition 
among similar drugs.87 The provincial drug benefit plans have successfully 
applied various cost management approaches that further restrain the cost 
of prescription drugs.88 Cost management approaches include use of price 
information89 and cost-effectiveness90 to determine formulary inclusion, 
reference pricing,91 provincial price regulation,92 promotion of generics,93 
 87. Id. at 14. Third-party purchasers, particularly the provincial drug benefit plans, use cost 
management approaches to further restrain prescription drug costs. Id. As large purchasers, these 
payers use price information, cost-effective evaluation, and reference pricing to determine formulary 
inclusion (or which drugs will be covered). Id. Additionally, Canada implements provincial price 
regulation, promotes generic substitution, and extensively reimburses for each prescription dispensed. 
Id. 
 88. Id. For a description of cost management tools, see Ake Blomqvist and Jing Xu, Pharmacare 
in Canada: Issues and Options, HEALTH CANADA (Sept. 2001), at 5–11, at 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/FIIQActualites/actualites/302_e.pdf. (last visited Oct. 24, 2004). 
 89. Gross, supra note 6, at 14. Each province in Canada has a formulary, or list of drugs that are 
covered under the plan, and there is variation between provinces as to which drugs are included. Id. 
The ability of a province’s plan to exclude a drug altogether from the formulary or to require prior 
authorization may give drug manufacturers the incentive to set lower prices so that the provinces 
include the products in the plan. Id. 
 90. Id. A particular drug’s cost-effectiveness is often used to determine whether to include the 
drug in the province’s plan. Id. If a drug manufacturer wishes to have its product included on the 
provincial drug benefit plan, the manufacturer must submit a form that details the drug’s clinical 
efficacy, as well as its cost-effectiveness. Thereafter, an independent committee of physicians and 
pharmacists review the submitted forms and make subsequent recommendations regarding coverage. 
Id. Based on the recommendations, the representative officials in each province determines whether 
the drug will be reimbursed for all patients with no restrictions, whether the drug will be reimbursed 
for those who meet certain clinical criteria, or whether it should not be reimbursed without a special 
written request specifically indicating why it is required for a particular patient. Id. Restrictions often 
occur when: the drug’s effectiveness relative to currently available therapy is minimal; the drug offers 
only marginal benefit relative to alternative treatment but at a much higher price in instances where the 
manufacturer’s data submission did not demonstrate its efficacy; or the drug is only cost-effective in a 
small subgroup of patients. Id. at 15. 
 91. Id. Reference pricing establishes reimbursement rates for categories of drugs and the 
conditions that the drugs treat. This approach seeks to set competitive pricing among therapeutically 
similar drugs. The reimbursement, or reference, price is set as the lowest cost of therapeutically similar 
products. Id. Those patients who are prescribed a different product are required to pay the difference 
between the cost of the prescribed drug and the reference drug price. Id. Studies of this reference price 
system have concluded that the result is substantial savings, and more importantly, the studies have not 
found adverse quality impacts or financial barriers to access. Id. For information regarding British 
Colombia’s reference price system, see Government of British Colombia Ministry of Health Services, 
Pharmacare: Reference Drug Program, available at http://www.hlth.gov.bc.ca/pharme/rdp/ 
rdpindex.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2004). 
 92. Gross, supra note 6, at 15. Some provinces regulate prices that they will pay for prescription 
drugs listed on their plans, and may prohibit price increases for those drugs that stay on the plan. Id. 
 93. Id. Closely tied to the above concept of reference pricing, promotion of generic substitution 
provides that the provincial drug benefit plans only pay the cost of the lowest priced generic drugs in 
situations where generics are available. Id. 
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and pharmacy reimbursement policies.94 Because they are large 
purchasers, the third-party buyers can successfully negotiate the terms of 
their plans, including coverage and reimbursement, with the drug 
manufacturers and pharmacies.95 As a result, patented drug prices are often 
below the maximum allowable prices set by the PMPRB.96 
3. Products Liability Litigation Costs 
Third, products liability litigation in the United States creates higher 
prices for American, as compared to Canadian consumers.97 Although the 
legal systems of the United States and Canada both evolved out of British 
common law,98 they have since diverged. Nowhere is this more evident 
than in the area of tort law and liability.99 Consequently, although the rules 
for pharmaceutical products liability in the United States are similar to 
Canadian negligence rules, Canadian courts have not been willing to hold 
manufacturers to the standards of care used in U.S. courts.100 Therefore, a 
significant part of the variation in price between prescription drug prices in 
the United States and Canada is attributable to liability costs and in 
particular, anticipated liability cost,101 which is often calculated by the 
 94. Id. Regarding pharmacy reimbursement, the provinces often establish the amount that 
pharmacies will be paid for each prescription dispensed. Controlling this amount may be done by 
considering actual acquisition cost, lowest cost alternative, maximum allowable cost, and best 
available price. Id. The plans may further determine what dispensing fees will be paid to the 
pharmacists. Id. 
 95. Id. at 14. 
 96. Id. at 14. Additionally, the lower costs tend to promote the use of less costly versions of 
therapeutically similar drugs. Id. 
 97. Id. at 16. Various studies suggest that one-third to one-half of any prescription drug price 
differential between Canada and the United States is based on the higher cost of protection from legal 
liability. Id. In particular, Canada limits personal injury compensation to C$250,000. Id. The cost of 
products liability litigation in the United States is substantially higher, and prescription drug prices in 
the United States reflect the added cost. Id. 
 98. GERAINT HOWELLS, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY 247 (1993) (indicating that eleven 
Canadian provinces and territories inherited English common law, while Quebec adopted the Civil 
Code of Lower Canada based on the French Napoleonic Code).  
 99. Id. at 248 (comparing the tort law principles of the United States and Canada). The 
complexity of Canadian law is further influenced by the United States, largely because Canada has 
closer social, economic, and cultural links with the United States than with United Kingdom. Id. See 
also Richard Manning, Products Liability and Prescription Drug Prices in Canada and the United 
States, 40 J.L. ECON. 203, 206–07 (1997). Manning suggests that the past few decades have seen a 
drift away from common law roots, while the same drift in the United States is a great deal more 
pronounced. Id. In particular, Manning cites as examples the evolution of strict products liability and 
market share liability in the United States. Id. 
 100. Id. at 207–08. Manning argues that Canadian judges are reluctant to expand drug 
manufacturer liability. Id. 
 101. For an analysis regarding products liability and subsequent price differentials of prescription 
drugs in the United States and Canada, see Manning, supra note 99, at 234. 
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product’s own litigation history.102 Pharmaceutical products liability both 
creates an incentive for companies to comply with regulations and 
promotes communication between manufacturers and physicians.103  
Procedural and substantive complications also contribute to higher 
products liability costs in the United States.104 First, the rights of litigants 
are more limited in the Canadian system. For example, Canadian litigants 
have more limited rights of appeal than do American litigants,105 and 
Canadian litigants do not have a right to a trial by jury in civil cases.106 
Second, differences in damage awards also contribute to higher prices in 
the United States. Punitive damages in Canada are rare, whereas in the 
United States they are increasingly common,107 while damages in Canada 
are set by judges rather than by juries.108 And third, there are differences in 
 102. Id. at 217. Often, summaries of litigation for various drugs are compiled, and the case 
histories of a variety of prescription drug products, including important cases, trial verdicts, and even 
settlements are studied in hopes of estimating future costs associated with litigation. Id. at 217–18. 
Manning’s study concludes that the age of a product often plays an important role. Id. at 217. In 
particular, older drugs have significantly higher price differentials than do more recently introduced 
drugs because of the litigation history associated with the older drugs. Id. 
 103. For an analysis of liability as an incentive for compliance with FDA standards, see Steven 
Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. 
L. REV. 237 (1998). An important reason for communication between the manufacturers and 
physicians, and the reason for a lack of communication between the manufacturers and patients, relates 
to products liability law for medical products. Id. at 266–67. Specifically, this lack of communication 
can be traced to the “learned intermediary rule,” which requires that physicians receive warnings and 
act as the learned intermediaries between the manufacturers and patients. Id. Manufacturers can be 
held liable for failure to warn physicians; yet, with few exceptions, manufacturers have no duty to 
warn patients directly and will only be held liable for defective warnings given to patients.” Id. 
 104. See, e.g., HOWELLS, supra note 98, at 247 (comparing the tort law principles of, among other 
countries, the United States and Canada). 
 105. For an explanation of how the possibility of appeals influences litigation, see Manning, supra 
note 99, at 208. 
 106. Id. See also HOWELLS, supra note 98, at 273. Many of the larger claims in the United States 
are often attributed to sympathetic juries, but in Canada, jury trials are less frequent. Id. An Ontario 
law practitioner estimated that only ten percent of cases used juries, and those that did were usually the 
result of the requests of defendants who believed juries are less generous than judges, not the 
plaintiffs, as is the case in the United States. Id. 
 107. Id. at 272. Punitive damages are awarded less frequently in Canada, and when awarded, are 
given in less dramatic amounts. Id. Moreover, Canada does not have the problem regarding excessive 
awards for non-pecuniary losses, largely due to a cap of C$100,000 instituted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 1978. Id. at 273. Although this cap has increased to account for inflation, it still acts as a 
barrier against excessive claims. Id. 
 108. Manning, supra note 99, at 208. Manning assumes that even if juries are more willing than 
judges to favor plaintiffs when damages are awarded, damages will be higher in the United States 
because of the roles of judge and jury in Canada and the United States, respectively. Id. Even if 
Canadian judges are more willing to favor plaintiffs, the amount of damages that they can award is 
limited based on Canadian statutory limitations. Id. 
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the products liability environment, which are created by contingency fees 
and the availability of class action suits in the United States.109 
4. Research and Development Costs 
A fourth reason for the price variation between the United States and 
Canada involves R&D costs.110 Because R&D serves all consumers in all 
countries that use the particular product, the cost cannot be attributed to 
any particular group.111 Although many advocates argue for equal 
distribution of cost,112 economic theory supports the opposite 
conclusion.113 Discovery, research, and development costs are sunk; 
incremental production costs for pharmaceuticals are modest; and drug 
profitability depends on the product’s ability to generate revenue, often by 
using non-uniform pricing structures.114 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS: A SURVEY OF OPTIONS 
The actions that Congress deliberately avoids may be just as important 
as the actions Congress consciously undertakes.115 For example, although 
the implications for health care are not entirely clear, some regulatory 
policies are likely to be detrimental. Examples include certain forms of 
 109. HOWELLS, supra note 98, at 272. Contingency fees are rare in Canada, and banned in 
Ontario. Id. Moreover, Canada has a rule that costs are awarded against the losing party. Id. Howells 
suggests that if there were a similar rule in the United States, the prevailing attitude of “nothing 
ventured, nothing gained” would require considering the costs associated with a loss. Id. 
 110. See generally Stephen Latham, Pharmaceutical Costs: An Overview and Analysis of Legal 
and Policy Responses by the States, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 141 (2003). The increased cost of prescription 
drugs stems from R&D risks, and the industry has a tendency to build the cost into each pill, thus 
increasing the prices. Id. at 147. 
 111. DANZON, supra note 26, at 41.  
 112. See generally Latham, supra note 110. One argument advanced by opponents of differential 
pricing is that other countries are “free riders,” declining to pay their fair share of R&D costs and 
hoping that the United States and other wealthier countries will pick up the slack. Id. at 147–48. 
 113. DANZON, supra note 26, at 41. “Ramsey pricing” concludes that charging different prices to 
different consumers based on the elasticity of demand is the most efficient way of recovering joint 
sunk costs. Id. 
 114. See BERNDT, supra note 76, at 11–12. R&D costs are estimated at over $350–400 million, 
and production costs, due to economies of scale, are minimal. As such, differential pricing often 
creates increasing sales volumes and greater market share. Id. For other estimates regarding the high 
risk of pharmaceutical R&D, see Latham, supra note 110. Development of a new drug may take nearly 
twelve to fifteen years and cost hundreds of millions of dollars, and if investors cannot be convinced of 
the possibility of profit corresponding to the risk, the investors seek other investments. Id. at 150. 
Moreover, unequal pricing allows drugs to be sold at lower costs to buyers who could not otherwise 
afford to pay for a “per-pill” share of R&D. Id. at 148. 
 115. See, e.g., JOHN E. CALFEE, PRICES, MARKETS, AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL REVOLUTION 
(2000). 
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price controls and permitting continued sales of prescriptions over the 
Internet.116 While price controls may be inevitable without considerable 
changes in the pharmaceutical industry’s behavior, there are price controls 
that likely would do more harm than good in the long-run.117 Suggested 
price controls include extending Medicaid discounts to neighborhood 
pharmacies, cutting United States prescription prices to match those 
charged in other countries, and imposing direct controls on the industry.118 
However, these price controls would deter the pharmaceutical industry’s 
development of new drugs,119 and its search for additional uses for existent 
drugs.120 Burdened with these controls, the pharmaceutical industry would 
certainly forego financial incentives to research and develop new drugs, 
but may also lose the financial resources to do so. Moreover, if these 
controls were to be put in place and subsequently met with disfavor, 
dismantling such controls in the future would likely be difficult.121  
While regulation of this industry must strike a delicate balance in order 
to maintain the benefits of the current system, it is worthwhile to consider 
alternatives. Different forms of price regulation that merit evaluation for 
use in the United States include uniform pricing, direct price regulation, 
manufacturer-specific budgets, reference price limits on reimbursement, 
rate-of-return regulation, physician drug budgets, drug reimbursement, 
patient co-payments, and managed health care. 
A. Uniform Pricing 
Uniform pricing of pharmaceutical products is an option to consider as 
a means of balancing competing concerns of prices and incentives. Under 
uniform pricing, one price is set for a particular product across the 
board.122 
 116. Id. at 45–53. 
 117. Id. at 2–3. 
 118. Id. at 2. 
 119. PATRICIA M. DANZON, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION: NATIONAL POLICIES VERSUS 
GLOBAL INTERESTS 1–4 (1997). R&D costs make pharmaceuticals vulnerable to aggressive price 
regulation, and companies would be limited in future innovative R&D. Id. at 3–4. 
 120. See, e.g., CALFEE, supra note 115, at 2. Fundamental changes in the industry over the past 
few decades include “scientific advances in pharmaceutical R&D and biotechnology, as well as 
institutional advances in drug testing, information processing, and dissemination of knowledge.” Id. at 
2–3. This combination of providing new treatments to existing patients and offering existing 
treatments to new patients is a result of the advances and should not be stymied by arbitrary price 
controls. Id. at 3. 
 121. See CALFEE, supra note 115, at 3. 
 122. See generally BERNDT, supra note 76. 
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However, there are considerable arguments against this approach. For 
example, uniform pricing legislation often omits crucial details regarding 
the definition, implementation, and enforcement of uniform pricing 
policies.123 Moreover, even if legislation promoting uniform pricing 
passed—certainly no simple proposition—several potential adverse 
consequences remain. These include greater uncertainty about the 
consistency of particular pricing policies,124 increased litigation,125 average 
price increases,126 and enhanced possibilities for implicit price collusion.127 
Furthermore, uniform pricing disregards the realities of real-world 
manufacturing. Manufacturers charge prices to recover the costs of 
manufacturing, distributing, and R&D.128 As such, manufacturers charge 
different prices to different consumers, based on each consumer’s ability 
and willingness to pay.129 
B. Direct Price Regulation 
Direct price regulation is another option to consider as a way to balance 
the competing concerns of prices and incentives. Direct price regulation 
takes several forms and often varies by country.130 France, Italy, and Spain 
have strict governmental control over the pharmaceutical prices charged to 
insurers and consumers, and these countries use multiple criteria for 
 123. Id. That is, several important details would likely be omitted, such as the points in the 
distribution chain where prices must be uniform (i.e., initial point of sales or intermediate points), the 
length of time the prices must be the same (i.e., over the length of a multiyear contract, over a fiscal 
year, or on a daily basis), and whether preexisting multi-year contracts would be invalidated or 
grandfathered in. Id. at 13. 
 124. Id. at 14. During the period of uncertainty, pharmaceutical firms would likely be cautious in 
introducing innovative discounting policies because of confusion surrounding the precise 
interpretation of the legislation. Id. 
 125. Id. As a result of the greater uncertainty, there likely would be increased litigation over the 
proper interpretation of the legislation. Id. As such, any resolution through litigation would require 
substantial time and resources. Id. 
 126. Id. at 14–15. Firms would alter their pricing behavior because of changes on both the demand 
side and supply side of the market. Id. On the demand side, growth of managed-pharmacy provider 
services has led to greater non-uniform pricing in the industry. Id. at 15. On the supply side, there has 
been an increase in the number of drugs offered in recent years. Id.  
 127. Id. at 16. When active discounting is allowed and deal-making is encouraged, cooperation 
among pharmaceutical companies is difficult to achieve because of the desire for profit and market 
share. Id. By contrast, regulating prices to discourage vigorous competition creates an environment 
that facilitates the possibility of implicit collusion within the industry. Id. 
 128. John R. Graham, Prescription Drug Prices in Canada and the United States—Part 2: Why 
the Difference, THE FRASER INSTITUTE (Sept. 2000), at http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/ 
readmore.asp?sNav=pb&rid=161 (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). 
 129. Id. When segmenting markets by country, manufacturers often use measures of national 
income to guide price structuring—that is, wealthier countries pay more. Id. 
 130. See, e.g., DANZON, supra note 119, at 16–29. 
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setting those prices.131 These countries require that introductory prices of 
new products and price increases of existing products be approved by the 
government if they are to be reimbursed by the social insurance system.132 
Canada utilizes a similar form of price control, using the PMPRB to 
monitor prices of pharmaceuticals and determine whether the prices being 
charged are reasonable.133 The United States considered a similar proposal 
in then-President Clinton’s Health Security Act, which proposed an 
advisory council to evaluate the reasonableness of the prices of new 
drugs.134 However, none of these systems have considered the problem of 
global joint costs,135 and, ultimately, they rely on negotiation and political 
discretion to establish costs for particular consumers.136 
C. Manufacturer-Specific Budgets 
A limitation based on manufacturer-specific budgets, also known as 
revenue limits, is another option by which the competing concerns of 
prices and incentives can be balanced. In this option, the government sets 
a target growth rate for general pharmaceutical expenditures and then 
negotiates with each manufacturer a firm-specific limit on that firm’s total 
sales (or revenue) for the year.137 If the particular firm overshoots the set 
target, then its prices are reduced.138 This system, in theory, gives 
 131. Id. at 16. For example, Italy had used a complex pricing formula based on total cost, with 
markups for therapeutic merit and contribution to the domestic economy. Id. France had considered 
internal comparisons with existing products, therapeutic merit, and contribution to the domestic 
economy, as well as comprehensive revenue limits and manufacture revenue limits. Id. at 16–17. For a 
discussion of comprehensive revenue limits and manufacture revenue limits, see infra notes 137–39 
and accompanying text. 
 132. DANZON, supra note 119, at 16. Inflation adjustments are rarely granted, and price cuts are 
sometimes mandated. Id. Additionally, wholesale and retail distribution margins regulate the retail 
prices charged to insurers and consumers. Id. 
 133. Id. at 17. The reasonable benchmark price for innovative products is the median of prices 
charged in nine other countries. Id. Reasonable benchmark prices for products that offer only little or 
no therapeutic advance over existing products are tied to prices of existing drugs. Id. Post-launch price 
increases may not exceed the growth of the general consumer price index. Id. 
 134. Id. This proposal incorporated elements of several of the aforementioned foreign systems. Id. 
 135. Id. at 3. Global joint costs include costs that are essential to supply the drug but cannot be 
attributed to any individual consumer or country, but rather represent the cost that the whole world has 
to pay for a particular pharmaceutical product. Id. 
 136. Id. at 18. Even price negotiation carries problems of uncertainty and delay beyond that 
associated with obtaining approval of safety, efficacy, and quality. Id. Moreover, the delay in the 
launch of new products results in foregone benefits for consumers and loss of revenue for 
manufacturers that cannot be recovered. The loss to many facturers is due to the fact that the time left 
on the patent is not extended in situations where there has been a delay in pricing approval. Id. 
 137. Id. In 1994, France adopted this system, but the anticipated flexibility did not materialize as 
planned as individual negotiations remain for major drugs. Id. at 19. 
 138. Id. at 18. 
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manufacturers greater flexibility in pricing individual products, subject to 
a general revenue limit, and reduces the uncertainty and administrative 
cost of product-by-product price negotiations.139 
D. Reference Price Limits on Reimbursement 
Another option to consider, reference price limits on reimbursement, is 
used in, among other countries, Canada.140 Under this system, several 
drugs are grouped together based on therapeutically similar properties, and 
the government or insurer sets a single reimbursement price141 for all 
products in this cluster.142 With this system the manufacturer is permitted 
to charge more than the set reference price, but the patient must pay the 
difference as an out-of-pocket charge.143 
Problems are also apparent with this system. In reality, manufacturers 
rarely charge more than the reference price because patients are unwilling 
to pay excess co-payments.144 Additionally, although reference pricing 
may create competition between products within the same category, 
reference pricing may actually reduce competition between products 
below the reference price.145 Moreover, the impact of reference pricing on 
drug spending clearly depends on how broadly the groups of 
therapeutically similar drugs are defined, as well as on how the reference 
price is set.146 
 139. Id. at 18–19. Similar restraints closely associated with revenue limits include restraint on 
promotional expenditures, improved informational systems, and attempts to limit prescribing products 
to medically appropriate uses. Id. However, the intended results have not yet been realized. Id. 
 140. Id. at 19. This system has been introduced in the Canadian province of British Columbia, as 
well as in Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and New Zealand. Id. 
 141. Id. This reimbursement price is also known as the reference price. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. “Maximum allowable charge systems used in many Medicaid and managedcare programs 
in the United States are similar, but only apply to generic substitutes.” Id. at 19 n.1. 
 144. Id. at 19. This has been the case in Germany, where physicians are required by law to explain 
to patients why such a charge is necessary. Id. The result has been either a reluctance to make co-
payments or the creation of highly elastic demand at prices above the reference price. Id. 
 145. Id. That is, manufacturers typically have an incentive to cut prices where demand is elastic. 
Id. But in a reference pricing system, demand is inelastic at prices below the reference price because 
any difference between the manufacturer price and the reference price credits the government, thus 
voiding the incentives of physicians, pharmacists, and patients to demand a change in volume. Id. at 
19–20. 
 146. For an analysis of the impact of defining groups and setting initial reference prices, see id. at 
20–21.  
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E. Rate-Of-Return Regulation 
Another option to consider, rate-of-return regulation, regulates profits 
rather than prices.147 The goals of this system are “to secure the provision 
of safe and effective medicines . . . at reasonable prices . . . and to promote 
a strong and profitable pharmaceutical industry . . . capable of such 
sustained R&D expenditures as should lead to the future availability of 
new and improved medicines.”148 Each company negotiates with the 
government for an allowed total rate-of-return on capital (ROC).149 “Any 
excess is ‘repaid’ either directly or through a price reduction. Conversely, 
companies that fail to meet their target ROC may apply for a price 
increase.”150 
Although this system explicitly recognizes the need for return on R&D, 
ROC has several potential problems. These include the creating of 
incentives for “creative accounting” and the distorting of real resource 
use.151 In response, the regulations associated with the allocation of costs 
and allowable promotional expenditures have become increasingly 
detailed.152 As such, these limits are detrimental to smaller companies 
introducing new products.153 
F. Physician Drug Budgets 
Another option utilized to control drug spending involves physician 
drug budgets and physician accountability for their prescribing habits.154 If 
 147. Id. at 21. Under this system “companies are free to set launch prices of new products, 
provided that the total rate-of-return on capital (ROC) . . . does not exceed a specified limit,” usually 
between seventeen and twenty-one percent. Id. There is a grey area within which the companies may 
retain some or part of any profit above the target, provided that they renegotiate. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. This system is in effect in, among other countries, the United Kingdom. Id.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. Creative accounting strategies have tended to be used to maximize reimbursement, while 
real resource use is changed to maximize the rate base, and as such, the maximum allowed profit. Id. at 
21–22. See also Harvey Averch & Leland Johnson, Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint, 
52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962), available at http://www.jstor.org/view/00028282/ 
di950373/95p0073x/0 (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
 152. DANZON, supra note 119, at 22. Rules for allowable promotional expenditures are 
renegotiated with companies for the following year, and provisional targets are often set up two years 
in advance. Id. “The limits for promotion and R&D do not apply to actual expenditures but to the 
amount that can be included in the base of the ROC calculation.” Id.  
 153. Id. Smaller companies introducing new products face the difficulties of the high cost of 
application for marketing authorization and post-marketing surveillance. Id. 
 154. Id. at 24. This option is used in, among other countries, Germany. Id. “Even physicians who 
do not profit directly from dispensing drugs may use prescriptions as means to stimulate additional 
patient visits.” This system seeks to limit such excesses. Id. 
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total drug spending exceeds the target drug budget, the government 
charges the cost against the future budgets of physicians and drug 
manufacturers.155 
This system is flawed because it creates the wrong incentives. Office-
based physicians, who are subject to the cap, often refer patients to 
hospitals that are not subject to the cap or avoid seeing high-cost patients 
altogether.156 Moreover, simplistic budgetary limitations create a lack of 
information necessary to treat individual patients and create physician 
incentives to switch from newer, more innovative and costly drugs to 
older, less costly generics, without concern for therapeutic suitability.157 
G. Drug Reimbursement 
Another option to consider is a system of drug reimbursement that 
incorporates both regulation and competition.158 Under this system the 
government sets a reimbursement price for each drug, the dispensing 
physician or hospital receives the reimbursement payment from the social 
insurance program, and profits result from any margin between the 
reimbursement price and the manufacturer’s price.159 The government 
monitors the actual manufacturer prices charged and reduces the 
reimbursement price for those drugs that have excessive margins.160 
The effect of this system is to destroy R&D incentives, as it triggers 
price reductions from manufacturers, causing both actual manufacturer 
prices and government reimbursement prices to fall over a drug’s life 
 155. Id. Individual physicians in Germany are assigned budgets based on their specialty, and 
deviations of more than twenty-five percent from the mean budget result in review and possible 
financial penalties. Id. “In Germany, if total drug spending exceeds the target drug budget, the first 280 
million deutschemarks are charged to the physician budget for the following year. The next 280 
million deutschemarks are charged to the drug manufacturers to reduce their incentives for drug 
promotion.” Id. 
 156. Id. at 25. This results in a general increase in total cost because it only shifts the cost from a 
regulated group subject to a cap, to an unregulated group not subject to the cap. Id. For an in depth 
analysis of how firms seek to maximize profit but are subject to a constraint on rate of return, see 
generally Averch & Johnson, supra note 151. 
 157. DANZON, supra note 119, at 25. As such, this system passes the buck rather than fixing the 
underlying problem. Id. 
 158. Id. The system of drug reimbursement using both regulation and competition is associated 
with, among other countries, Japan and South Korea. Id.  
 159. Id. As such, “[d]rug manufacturers thus have incentives to cut their prices below the 
reimbursement price in order to increase the financial incentives of physicians to prescribe their drugs 
over those of their competitors.” Id. at 25–26. 
 160. Id. at 26. In Japan, the government reevaluates the prices every two years. Id. The zone of 
reasonableness for which the reimbursement price can differ from the actual manufacturer’s price is 
around thirteen percent. Id. 
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cycle.161 Consequently, the incentives for R&D are directed toward 
producing a high volume of new products, even if the new products 
contain only minor improvements over existing products.162 
H. Patient Co-Payments 
A patient co-payment system factors patient cost-sharing into social 
insurance programs.163 However, in actuality, cost-sharing is often limited 
by supplementary insurance164 or exemptions.165 Additionally, co-
payments on physician visits, which factor into the total cost of obtaining a 
prescription, are often low in countries that follow the co-payment 
system.166 
Moreover, insurance in European countries traditionally covered a 
more extensive range of drugs, and as such, patient concern for prices has 
not limited demand for drugs.167 In response, certain countries increased 
patient co-payments and “delisted” several drugs, thus making them 
ineligible for reimbursement.168 However, the effects of these practices are 
uncertain at best and would adversely affect those who benefit from co-
payments.169 
 161. Id. This system passes savings to consumers only after a two-year lag, when prices are 
revised downward. Id.  
 162. Id. Although prices are subject to downward departure every two years, manufacturers can 
only obtain a price increase by introducing new products. Id. It is this incentive structure that has been 
credited for the Japanese R&D bias toward minor extensions of existing products rather than 
innovative significant therapeutic advances. Id. 
 163. Id. at 27. Many European countries use this system of requiring patient co-payments, where 
the patient pays expenditures on reimbursable products out of pocket. Id. For example, France has 
patient co-payments up to seventy percent depending on the class of drug, but only about three percent 
of expenditures on reimbursable products are actually paid by the patient because most people have 
supplementary insurance that covers the rest. Id. 
 164. Id. Moreover, insurance in European countries traditionally covered a more extensive range 
of drugs and, as such, cost-consciousness has not served as a constraint on demand for drugs. Id.  
 165. Id. For example, in the United Kingdom, “more than 80 percent of sales are exempt because 
of exemptions for the elderly, needy, and other categories.” Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. Traditional drug coverage in certain European countries has included, “cold and cough 
remedies, laxatives, and other preparations that U.S. consumers typically purchase over the counter 
and without reimbursement.” Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 27–28. Increasing co-payments is likely to be only a “minimal deterrent except for low-
income patients or those on chronic medications.” Id. at 28. 
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I. Managed Health Care 
A final option to consider is managed health care.170 Recently, 
managed health care techniques have spread to pharmaceuticals through 
HMOs and specialty pharmacy benefit management companies that 
manage drug benefits for HMOs.171 These techniques include formularies 
of preferred drugs, physician education and monitoring, and generic and 
therapeutic substitution.172 These techniques move the market share 
toward preferred drugs, thereby giving the HMO managers leverage in 
negotiating discounts from manufacturers.173 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Future American policies that determine drug prices must balance the 
need to control patients’ health care costs with the need to preserve 
incentives for R&D innovation. Any single form of regulation has not 
been and will not be effective in balancing these interests.174 State and 
local governments have defied the FDA ban on reimportation and will 
continue to do so.175 The failure to prevent the reimportation of 
prescription drugs leads to the conclusion that long-term solutions must be 
implemented in order to fix the underlying problem. In order to balance 
the competing interests, a comprehensive solution is required for long-
term success. 
“The . . . high ratio of globally joint sunk costs . . . to user-specific 
marginal costs creates the opportunity and leverage for regulators and 
other major purchasers to force prices down to marginal costs.”176 
However, although prices can be lowered with minimal short-term effects, 
over time this practice would hamper the development of innovative 
drugs.177 Just as detrimental, however, is the amount, as a percentage of 
 170. Id. This system is used in, among other countries, the United States. Id. 
 171. Id. Insurance coverage for outpatient drugs is traditionally lower than for other ambulatory 
services. Moreover, prescription drug prices were unregulated and reimbursement under these 
traditional insurance plans gave the prescribing physician choice of which drugs to prescribe. Id. 
 172. Id. at 28–29. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Even with federal regulations and court rulings, state and local governments disregard federal 
regulations and reimport prescription drugs from, among other places, Canada. See, e.g., supra notes 4 
and 5 and accompanying text. 
 175. See Thornburgh, supra note 4. Mayor Michael Albano made Springfield, Massachusetts, the 
first city in the nation to officially encourage its employees to buy prescription drugs from Canada, 
even though this is prohibited by federal law. Id. 
 176. DANZON, supra note 119, at 92. 
 177. Id. at 92–93. Short-term reduction of prices would have little effect on the supply of existing 
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total income, that some American consumers are forced to pay for 
prescription drug coverage.178  
Reimportation of prescription drugs from Canada does not address the 
pharmaceutical industry’s need to come up with capital to pay for joint 
sunk costs. Moreover, reimportation of prescription drugs threatens both 
the health of the American consumer and the current system of price 
disparity, in which less wealthy countries are still able to receive 
medication.179  
Of the above-mentioned possibilities, a combination of two appears 
most viable. First, government subsidization of manufacturers’ costs 
would promote innovations in R&D. This should be combined with a 
modified, managed healthcare program that would leverage favorable 
price discounts. In this proposed comprehensive solution the government 
would subsidize manufacturers’ costs via tax breaks. Additionally, the 
government would need to appoint a primary purchaser of prescriptions, 
similar to Canada’s PMPRB. Moreover, price controls must be avoided 
because they tend to discourage incentives for future investment and are 
ultimately a short term response to a larger problem.180 Finally, the 
primary purchaser would use monopsonistic bargaining techniques to 
weaken the monopolistic power of the pharmaceutical industry.181 The end 
result would be that health care costs rise slightly in order to provide more 
expensive prescription drugs, yet the level would be somewhat controlled 
by a single purchaser exerting pressure on members of the industry to keep 
prices at a minimum. 
drugs and likely would have little effect on drugs already being developed. Id. However, long-term 
results would be affected by the price regulations, as marginal cost pricing would cover only about 
thirty percent of total cost. Id. This effect, however, might not be noticed or felt for over a decade 
because the supply of innovative drugs depends on global revenues and has a lag time of several years. 
Id.  
 178. See Importation of Prescription Drugs from Canada, supra note 16. 
 179. The pharmaceutical industry’s campaign to blacklist Canadian pharmacies that fill and sell 
prescription drugs to American consumers has taken a substantial toll. See, e.g., Graeme Smith, 
Crackdown Taking Toll on Internet Pharmacies, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 24, 2004, at 
http://health.workopolis.com/servlet/Content/fasttrack/20040424/INTERNET24?section=HR (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2004). 
 180. See CALFEE, supra note 115, at 62. 
 181. For an explanation of monopsonistic bargaining techniques and how a single buyer can 
exercise power in a system that closely parallels the monopolistic power of a single seller, see 
generally DANZON, supra note 26. 
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CONCLUSION 
As a final caveat, it is important to understand that Canada’s success at 
restraining prices of patented drugs has not fully stemmed the growth of 
prescription drug spending but, rather, has helped control spending 
levels.182 Whether this proposed composite management system for health 
care will create an appropriate balance between cost control and incentives 
for innovation is uncertain, but it is certainly worth trying in order to fix 
the underlying problem. 
Benjamin A. Drabiak* 
 182. See Gross, supra note 6, at 18. 
 * Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Peace, War, and Defense (2002), The University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D./M.B.A. (2006), Washington University School of Law and Olin 
School of Business. First, I would like to thank my parents, Joan and Richard Baltz, as well as my 
family and friends for all their support and encouragement. Additionally, many thanks go to the 
editorial staff of the Washington University Global Studies Law Review for all the time and effort they 
spent working on this Note. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/6
